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ARTICLE
THE RECUSAL ALTERNATIVE TO CAMPAIGN
FINANCE LEGISLATION
JOHN COPELAND NAGLE*
Typical campaign finance proposals focus on limiting the amount of
money that can be contributed to candidates and the amount of money
candidates can spend. This Article suggests an alternative proposal that
places no restrictions on contributions or spending, but rather targets the
corrupting influence of contributions. Under the proposal, legislators
would be required to recuse themselves from voting on issues directly af-
fecting contributors. The author contends that this proposal would prevent
corruption and the appearance of corruption while remedying the First
Amendment objections to the regulation of money in campaigns.
Campaign finance legislation is necessary, we are told, be-
cause of the corruption and apparent corruption that accompa-
nies the money given to political candidates. Millions of dollars
are spent on contributions to candidates for elected office. Why?
Many believe that contributors-especially big contributors-
hope to receive some reward for their generosity, such as a vote
against a troublesome bill, a promise to push for a tax break, or a
night in the Lincoln bedroom. Even if the contributor and the
candidate both enjoy the most altruistic motives, many in the
public believe that they have cut an illicit deal.
The typical response to this corruption or appearance of cor-
ruption is to propose restrictions on the amount of money that
may be contributed to a candidate and the amount of money that
the candidate may spend in a campaign. The Federal Election
Campaign Act (FECA), expanded by Congress in the aftermath
of the campaign finance scandals of the Watergate era, featured
both contribution and expenditure limits.' Today Congress is
considering numerous proposed statutes to close the perceived
loopholes that have allowed lots of money to flow from con-
tributors to candidates notwithstanding the existing legal restric-
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' See 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-455 (1971).
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tions.2 States are even more aggressive in their efforts to control
the amount of money involved in political campaigns. 3
But spending and contribution limits suffer from numerous
flaws as tools for combating corruption. The experience of the
past quarter century with FECA shows that often the law has
simply prompted contributors and candidates to become more
ingenious in their efforts to give and spend money in campaigns.
Campaign contributions flow like water: whenever one obstacle
appears, the stream is simply diverted until it finds another way
to proceed.4 Moreover, laws prohibiting the contribution and
spending of money for political campaigns strike at the heart of
First Amendment values. Buckley v. Valeo was only the first of
numerous decisions invalidating the efforts of Congress, the
Federal Election Commission (FEC), and the states to regulate
campaign contributions and expenditures. 5 Furthermore, the laws
still allow legislators to act on any matter that affects parties
who have given them money.
These standard objections to campaign finance reform legisla-
tion are forceful,6 but they overlook the fundamental manner in
which such laws are misdirected. Restrictions on the amount of
money that may be contributed or spent in a political campaign
2 See, e.g., infra note 12.
3 See, e.g., infra note 37.
4 This metaphor has occurred to others. See Samuel Issacharoff and Pamela S. Karlan,
The Hydraulics of Campaign Finance Reform, 77 Tax. L. REV. 1705, 1708 (1999)
(noting that "political money, like water, has to go somewhere"); Daniel R. Ortiz, Wa-
ter, Water Everywhere, 77 Tax. L. REv. 1739, 1742 (1999) (referring to "Issacharoff
and Karlan's evocative hydraulic metaphor" and observing that "[i]f we constrict one
path, it will take another").
5 See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (invalidating parts of the 1974 amendments
to FECA, including the expenditure limits); see also, e.g., Colorado Republican Cam-
paign Comm. v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604 (1996) (invalidating the application of FECA's
party contribution provision to money that a political party spends independently with-
out coordination with any candidate); FEC v. National Conservative PAC, 470 U.S. 480
(1985) (invalidating a prohibition on PAC's spending more than $1,000 to support any
presidential or vice presidential candidate who receives public funds); North Carolina
Right to Life, Inc. v. Bartlett, 168 E3d 705 (4th Cir. 1999) (striking down state limits
on campaign contributions made by non-economic political action committees and by
nonprofit corporations); FEC v. Christian Coalition, 52 F. Supp. 2d 45 (D.D.C. 1999)
(holding that the distribution of voter's guides does not constitute prohibited express
advocacy of a candidate).
6 See, e.g., Kathleen M. Sullivan, Against Campaign Finance Reform, 1998 UTAH L.
REV. 311; Bradley A. Smith, Money Talks: Speech, Corruption, Equality, and Cam-
paign Finance, 86 GEo. L.J. 45 (1997); Bradley A. Smith, Faulty Assumptions and
Undemocratic Consequences of Campaign Finance Reform, 105 YALE L.J. 1049
(1996); Lillian R. BeVier, Money and Politics: A Perspective on the First Amendment
and Campaign Finance Reform, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1045 (1985); see also Issacharoff &
Karlan, supra note 4, at 1734 ("part[ing] company with the most prominent reformers
of campaign finance regulations" and offering "far more modest" proposals).
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address a symptom, not a cause. The premise underlying the use
of campaign finance legislation to combat corruption is that
money is the root of all evil.7 Another proverb is more apt. It
states that it is the influence of money-not money itself-that is
the root of all evil.8 The influence or perceived influence of
money accounts for most of the support for campaign finance
reform legislation. The remedy, therefore, is to eliminate that
influence and the perception that there is any such influence.
I propose the following alternative: allow contributors to give
whatever they want to political candidates, but require successful
candidates to recuse themselves from voting on or participating
in any legislation or other matters that directly affect those con-
tributors. Recusal provides the most direct response to the ap-
parent corrupting influence of campaign contributions. The me-
chanics of how to establish a recusal requirement based on cam-
paign contributions present some difficult choices, 9 though the
system of campaign spending regulation that a recusal require-
ment would replace is hardly a model of effortless enforcement
itself. By contrast, the virtues of a recusal requirement are
straightforward. Corruption and its appearance are avoided, the
First Amendment is protected, and contributors and candidates
are free to decide what to do.
Of course, it remains questionable whether campaign contri-
butions are actually corrupting. If they are not corrupting, then
both a recusal requirement and contribution limits are unneces-
sary. Even if they are corrupting, the typical reform proposals
are misguided. Influence and money are not identical, and one
can be regulated without imperiling the other. That is my solu-
tion to the campaign finance problem.
7 See Daniel Hays Lowenstein, On Campaign Finance Reform: The Root of all Evil is
Deeply Rooted, 18 HOFSTRA L. REV. 301, 302 (1989) (defending campaign finance
reform as responsive to "that strain in our culture that perceives money as the root of all
evil"); see also ALAN ROSENTHAL, DRAWING THE LINE: LEGISLATIVE ETHICS IN THE
STATES 139 (1996) (analyzing campaign finance issues with the understanding that
"[flor the press and the public, money is the root of evil-not all evil, perhaps, but
much of it").
8 See 1 7Tm. 6:10 (advising that "the love of money is a root of all evil").
9 See infra text accompanying notes 50-95 (explaining how a recusal requirement
could operate).
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I. THE CAMPAIGN FINANCE PROBLEM AND ITS STANDARD
SOLUTIONS
Charges that the existing campaign finance system is "corrupt"
dominate the editorial pages of the New York Times.' The sys-
tem is corrupt because "it elevates the voice of the wealthy spe-
cial interests over that of the average voter."" Existing campaign
finance laws "have all been circumvented by the deviously con-
ceived fiction that the parties can raise so-called 'soft money'
outside Federal regulation."' 2 The problem extends to "President
10See, e.g., Senator Hegel's Deceptive Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 1999, at A24 (de-
crying "the corrupt status quo"); Campaign Finance Tactics, N.Y. TIMES, September 15,
1999, at A28 (referring to "the long, grinding effort to drive corrupt money out of the
process"); The $2 Billion Election, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 1999, at A18 (describing a
proposed tax cut as "[a] fairly good example of the corruption of campaign money"); A
Dubious Campaign Ruling, N.Y TIMES, Aug. 4, 1999, at A18 (decrying "the corrupting
power of money in elections"); A New Speaker Errs on Reform, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8,
1999, at A16 (referring to "a corrupt system" of campaign finance); A New Year for
Campaign Reform, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 27, 1998, § 4, at 8 (noting that "Americans will
have a new opportunity to rescue their political culture from the grip of corruption and
cynicism"); A Pivotal Vote on Campaign Reform, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 1997, at A26
(referring to "the nation's corrupt campaign finance system"); Next Round for Cam-
paign Reform, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 1997, at A22 (describing "[t]he challenge of clean-
ing up the nation's corrupt campaign finance system"); Clash Over Congressional
Cash, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 1993, at A16 (characterizing the campaign finance status quo
as "corrupt, outdated and harmful"); Priorities, Priorities, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 1992,
at A24 (describing the political process as "awash in corrupting campaign contribu-
tions"); Republican Snipers in the House, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12, 1992, § 4, at 20 (de-
nouncing "the present corrupt incumbent-protection campaign finance system"); An-
other Campaign Finance Fight, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 1999, at A22 (observing that
Senator McConnell (R-Ky.) had complained that the limes had editorialized on cam-
paign finance reform 114 times since the beginning of 1997)
" Where Did Campaign Finance Go?, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 1996, at A20. See also,
e.g., John McCain's Message, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 1999, § 4, at 14 (praising Senator
McCain (R-Ariz.) for illustrating "the crucial connection between campaign donations
and bad laws" benefitting special interests); A Republican Full House, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
2, 1999, at A34 (referring to "the corrupt campaign finance system that has kept [spe-
cial interests] so powerful"); The $2 Billion Election, supra note 10, at Ala (writing
that "[m]ore scandals and evidence of favors in return for donations are bound to cor-
rupt the system as fund-raising accelerates in coming months"); A New Year for Cam-
paign Reform, supra note 10, at 8 (explaining that "the nation's two biggest political
parties have completed their transformation from representing popular constituencies to
serving as fund-raising machines that cater to special interests," and concluding that
"the legislative and executive branches of Government will be more and more beholden
to the forces that give the money" after the 1998 elections); A Moment for Reform, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 9, 1997, § 4, at 14 (noting that "the current system of selling access for
corporate and to a lesser extent labor union money is a bipartisan invention"); Meeting
for Dollars, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 31, 1996, at A12 (writing that "party fund-raisers were
bartering meetings with President Clinton for contributions during the election cam-
paign this year"); Where Did Campaign Finance Go?, supra, at A20 (worrying that
"this Congress may outdo its predecessor in mortgaging the legislative process to pow-
erful donors").
12A New Year for Campaign Reform, supra note 10, at 8. See also Senator Hegel's
Deceptive Bill, supra note 10 (criticizing proposed legislation to limit but not eliminate
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Clinton's shameful legacy" during "one of the most corrupt
election campaigns in modem history" in 1996,13 and to congres-
sional campaigns as well.14 Thus the Times frequently calls for
new federal legislation, it opposes potential FEC nominees who
do not share its vision, 15 and it endorses public financing as the
ultimate solution to the corruption that plagues the system. 16
The New York Times is not alone. Hundreds of other newspa-
pers have editorialized in favor of campaign finance reform. 7
Organizations like Common Cause and New York University's
Brennan Center report on campaign finance scandals and press
for new reform legislation. Is Fred Wertheimer has made the case
for campaign finance reform in a dizzying host of forums, both
during his time as the president of Common Cause and in his
soft money because it "would not end the corrupt soft-money system so much as le-
gitimize it"); Campaign Reform Gains an Ally, N.Y. TivEs, July 24, 1999, at A14
(complaining that "unregulated donations to political parties are poisoning the political
process by allowing wealthy individuals, corporations and unions to use the 'party-
building' dodge to evade the Federal limitations on direct contributions to candidates"):
A New Speaker Errs on Reform, supra note 10, at A16 (stating that "[o]nce the Presi-
dential campaign heats up, hundreds of millions of dollars in soft money from special
interests will pollute the system"); Plotting Against Reform, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 1998,
at A16 (objecting to "the soft-money contributions that have made a mockery of the
nation's present fund-raising limits").
13 Janet Reno May Finally Get It, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 1998, at A22; accord Illegal
Use of Soft Money, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 1998, at A26 (describing the 1996 election
campaign as "one of the most corrupt in modem history"). See also A Moment for Re-
form, supra note 11, at 14 (objecting to the campaign fundraising tactics of President
Clinton and Vice President Gore in 1996).
14 See A Moment for Reform, supra note 6, at 14 ("Yes, of course, Congressional
fund-raising is corrupt at the core, too").
15 See Mischief in the Senate, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 1999, at A16 (insisting that Presi-
dent Clinton is right to resist naming Professor Bradley Smith to the FEC); An Insult to
Campaign Reform, N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 1999, at A28 (opposing the selection of Profes-
sor Smith to the FEC). For examples of Professor Smith's writings on campaign finance
reform, see Bradley A. Smith, Soft Money, Hard Realities: The Constitutional Prohibi-
tion on a Soft Money Ban, 24 J. LEGIS. 179 (1998); Smith, Money Talks, supra note 6;
Smith, Faulty Assumptions, supra note 6.
16 See Clash Over Congressional Cash, supra note 10, at A16 (advising that "[a]bsent
a decent infusion of public financing, it will be impossible to stop Congressional de-
pendence on special-interest money"); President Bush and the Sewer, N.Y TIMES, May
12, 1992, at A22 (concluding that "[t]he only way to reduce the influence of corrupting
private money and to help challengers is to supply public money").
17 See 144 CONG. REc. S10156 (daily ed. Sept. 10, 1998) (reprinting a list of 196
newspapers that had published more than 400 campaign finance reform editorials in the
preceding six months).
18 The activities of both groups are detailed in their web sites. See Common Cause:
Holding Power Accountable (visited July 21, 1999) <http://www.commoncause.org>;
Brennan Center, (visited July 21, 1999) <http://www.brennancenter.org/index.html>.
For lists of numerous other groups seeking to reform the campaign finance laws, see
Center for Responsive Politics: Links/Resources (visited July 21, 1999) <http://www.
opensecrets.org/resources.htm> (providing links to the web sites of other advocacy
groups).
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current position as head of Democracy 21.19 Scholars have urged
the reform of the existing system of financing electoral cam-
paigns. 20 Supportive members of Congress have delivered impas-
sioned speeches urging their colleagues to change the current
system for financing elections.21
The primary basis for their concern is the amount of money
that is raised for and spent on political campaigns. Candidates
raised $781.3 million and spent $740.4 million for the 1998 con-
gressional elections.2 Sixteen months before the 2000 elections,
prospective presidential candidates had raised over
$100 million-including $37 million raised by Texas Governor
George W. Bush-and they had already spent nearly
$50 million233 Fundraising estimates for one particularly inter-
esting 2000 Senate race run as high as $50 million.24
19 See, e.g., Campaign Advertising: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Telecommuni-
cations and Finance of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 102d Cong., 1st
Sess. 50 (1991) (statement of Fred Wertheimer); Fred Wertheimer & Susan Weiss
Manes, Campaign Finance Reform: A Key to Restoring the Health of our Democracy,
94 COLUM. L. REV. 1126 (1994); Fred Wertheimer, The PAC Phenomenon in American
Politics, 22 Aiuz. L. REV. 603 (1980); Fred Wertheimer, Candidate Carte Blanche,
N.Y TiMEs, Nov. 30, 1998, at A23.
20 See, e.g., DAVID B. MAGLEBY & CANDICE J. NELSON, THE MONEY CHASE: CON-
GRESSIONAL CAMPAIGN FINANCE RFORM 195-213 (1990) (offering a comprehensive
campaign finance reform proposal); Edward B. Foley, Equal-Dollars-Per-Voter: A Con-
stitutional Principle of Campaign Finance, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1204 (1994) (arguing
that "[tihe Constitution of the United States should contain a principle ... that would
guarantee to each eligible voter equal financial resources for purposes of suporting or
opposing any candidate or initiative on the ballot in any election held within the United
States"); Lowenstein, supra note 7, at 335, 348-66 (concluding that "[tJhe campaign
finance system is corrupt" and outlining a reform proposal).
21 See, e.g., 144 CONG. REC. S10147 (daily ed. Sept. 10, 1998) (statement of Sen.
Feingold (D-Wis.)) (asserting that "[t]he biggest threat to our democracy still comes
from this out-of-control campaign finance system"); id. at S10150 (statement of Sen.
Snowe (R-Me.)) (remarking that "[h]ow we choose our elected officials goes to the
heart of who we are as a nation"); id. at S10161 (statement of Sen. Thompson (R-
Tenn.)) (describing the current campaign finance system as "an open invitation to cor-
ruption"); id. at S10166 (statement of Sen. Glenn (D-Ohio)) (contending that campaign
finance law loopholes are "inviting corruption of the electoral process" and thus "they
threaten our democracy"); id. at S10166 (statement of Sen. Kennedy (D-Mass,)) (stat-
ing that "[tihe vast sums of special interest money pouring into campaigns are a cancer
on our democracy"); id. at S10170 (statement of Sen. Bumpers (D-Ark.)) (opining that
"the method of financing campaigns in this country [is) rotten to the core").
2 See FEC Reports on Congressional Fundraising for 1997-98 (visited July 21,
1999) <http:llwww.fec.govlpress/canye98.htm>. Those figures represented a decrease
of $9.2 million in receipts and $24.9 million in expenditures from the 1996 congres-
sional elections. See id.
23 See Financial Activity of 1999-2000 Presidential Campaigns Through June 30,
1999 (visited July 21, 1999) <http://www.fee.gov/finance/prsq299.htm>.
24 See Adam Nagourney, Backers Set Record Goal for First Lady, N.Y TIMES, July
16, 1999, at B1 (indicating that Hillary Rodham Clinton hopes to raise $25 million to
run for the Senate from New York, and that Rudolph Guiliani promised to match
Clinton's fundraising in "what is shaping up as the costliest Congressional contest in
Campaign Finance Reform
Large amounts of money contributed to and spent on political
campaigns is not necessarily bad. One would hope that people
would be interested enough in their governance to support those
who will represent their views. Moreover, the amount of money
is tiny compared to spending on Big Macs and other items that
are presumably less important to the health of a democratic soci-
etyY Still, it is not the money itself that is of concern, but rather
the influence that it has. If elected officials are making decisions
based on who gave them the most money for their campaigns,
then we have a problem.
The evidence suggests that we do have a problem. Certain in-
dividuals and organizations contribute far more to electoral
causes than other individuals and organizations. Corporations,
unions, wealthy individuals, trade associations, and trial attor-
neys contribute millions of dollars to political campaigns annu-
ally. So do the political action committees (PACs) established by
such interests. By contrast, as Senator Dole once observed,
"[t]here aren't any Poor PACs, or Food Stamp PACs or Nutrition
PACs or Medicare PACs. '' 26 Moreover, the interests of those con-
tributing such large sums often coincide with the votes of the
elected officials who receive them. There are many examples of
such apparent influence. Common Cause proclaimed in 1998
that alcohol, oil, transportation, and gambling interests all pro-
vided substantial campaign contributions to members of Con-
gress and were rewarded with favorable legislative action.27
Other observers, including members of Congress themselves,
the nation's history").
25 See 144 CONG. REc. S 10174 (daily ed. Sept. 10, 1998) (statement of Sen. Grams
(R-Minn.)) (noting that the $3.50 per person per year that is spent on elections in the
United States is less than the money spent on supporting the United Nations and "less
money than we spend on a Value Meal at McDonald's"). It is possible that Senator
Grams is more familiar with what lunch costs in Washington than what it costs in his
home state of Minnesota. See Telephone Interview with Professor Michael Stokes Paul-
sen, Minnesota Law School (July 27, 1999) (reporting that a Value Meal costs about
$2.99 in the Minneapolis area).
6 134 CONG. REc. S 1188 (daily ed. Feb. 23, 1988) (statement of Sen. Murkowski (R-
Ark.)) (quoting Elizabeth Drew, who quoted Senator Dole (R-Kan.)). But see id.
(statement of Sen. Murkowski) (responding that "there is a food stamp program, a
Medicare program, and a substantial array of welfare programs. They were enacted
because they were thought to be good ideas and, even if recently trimmed, they survive
because people still believe them to be good ideas and because they have substantial
constituencies.").
21 The Common Cause reports are detailed in their web site. See Common Cause
(visited July 20, 1999) <http://commoneause.org/publications/boozel.htm> (alcohol),
<http:llcommoncause.orglpublications/drilling.htm> (oil), <http://commoncause.org/
publications/concrete.htm> (transportation), <http://commoncause.org/publications/
062697_sdytoc.htm> (gambling).
20001
76 Harvard Journal on Legislation [Vol. 37
make similar claims. 2 This leads many congressional supporters
of campaign finance reform to conclude that "[t]he paramount
goal of any true effort to reform the system of financing elec-
tions for federal office must be to reduce the influence of special
interest money on elected officials. '" 29
But spending and contribution limits are blunt instruments for
rooting out corruption. They are overinclusive to the extent that
they prohibit contributions and expenditures that are truly inde-
pendent of any obligation between the donor and the candidate.
They are underinclusive to the extent that they allow smaller
contributions or other activities that really do instill an obliga-
tion between the candidate and the donor. They rely on the con-
tested assumption that contributors give money in order to per-
suade an elected official how to vote, rather than assuming that
contributors give money because they like the way an elected
official has already voted or promises to vote. Moreover, laws
28See, e.g., 144 CONG. REc. S10157 (daily ed. Sept. 10, 1998) (statement of Sen.
McCain) (describing a 1996 Democratic National Committee document outlining the
privileges that would be extended to large contributors); id. at S10159 (reprinting two
documents indicating the benefits offered to Republican campaign contributors); id. at
S10166 (statement of Sen. Kennedy (D-Mass.)) (arguing that campaign contributions
directed the way in which Republicans voted on bankruptcy, tobacco, and managed care
legislation). The empirical studies examining the actual influence of campaign contri-
butions are discussed infra note 101.
29 144 CONG. REc. S10164 (daily ed. Sept. 10, 1998) (statement of Sen. Chafee (R-
R.I.)). Accord 145 CONG. REc. H1305 (daily ed. Mar. 16, 1999) (statement of Rep.
Udall (D-N.M.)) (observing that people "view the system as one that is controlled by
special interests, and they do not believe that their voices are being heard"); id. at
H1306 (statement of Rep. Moore (D-Kan.)) (noting that "[p]eople in this country be-
lieve that both political parties receive so much corrupt money from interest groups,
from lobbyists, from other sources, that the whole system is corrupt"); 144 CONG. REc.
S10157 (daily ed. Sept. 10, 1998) (statement of Sen. McCain (R-Ariz.)) (asserting that
"there is undue influence on the part of special interests"); id. at S10158 (statement of
Sen. Reed (D-R.I.)) (encouraging Congress to pass campaign finance reform legislation
to "make elections about ideas and policies, and not auctions to the highest bidder"); id.
at S10160 (statement of Sen. Collins (R-Me.)) (asserting that "political equality is the
essence of democracy, and an electoral system fueled by money is one lacking in politi-
cal equality"); id. at S10163 (statement of Sen. Mikulski (D-Md.)) (arguing that "[bly
limiting the influence of those with big dollars, and increasing the influence of those
with big hearts, we can bring government back to where it belongs-with the people");
id. at S10166 (statement of Sen. Kennedy (D-Mass.)) (remarking that "[t]he voice of
the average citizen today is scarcely heard over the din of lobbyists and big corpora-
tions contributing millions of dollars to political campaigns and buying hundreds of TV
ads to promote the causes of their special interests"); id. at S10167 (statement of Sen.
Murray (D-Wash.)) (arguing that "[tihe campaign system is so clogged with money,
there is hardly room left for the average voter"); id. at S10170 (statement of Sen.
Bumpers (D-Ark.)) (stating that "[a]nybody who believes that a democracy can survive
when the people you elect and the laws you pass depend on how much money is given
for the cause are daydreaming").
I consider the other reasons why campaign finance legislation might be desirable il-
fra text accompanying notes 103-104.
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candidate Bill Bradley advocates the same ideas plus public
financing and free television broadcast time for candidates.
3 6
States have enacted a variety of sweeping campaign reform
measures that incorporate similar provisions.3 7 But Congress has
not enacted any of these proposals or anything like them.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has shown little willingness
to reconsider its conclusion that campaign spending is protected
by the First Amendment. Buckley held that the federal contribu-
tion limitations satisfied constitutional strict scrutiny because
they served the government's compelling interest in combating
corruption and its appearance, but the Court struck down the
federal expenditure limits because they did not achieve those
ends.38 The invalidation of the spending limits has made Buckley
the target of scholars supporting campaign finance legislation.
3 9
But rather than heeding those calls, the Court is perhaps more
likely to revisit its conclusion that campaign contributions may
be limited consistent with the First Amendment. Justice Thomas
said as much in the Supreme Court's most recent FECA deci-
sion,40 and soon the Court will decide a case that challenges the
constitutionality of the types of contribution expenditures that
were upheld in Buckley. 41 The upshot, in the colorful words of
Kathleen Sullivan, is that Buckley "has become the great white
whale of constitutional law: the more elusive its demise be-
36See Campaign Finance Reform Fact Sheet (visited Oct. 25, 1999)
<http://www.billbradley.com/bin/article.pl?path=220799/2>. An earlier version of the
McCain-Feingold bill would have encouraged voluntary compliance with spending
restrictions by providing public campaign financing and discounted television adver-
tising. See SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF, PAMELA S. KARLAN & RICHARD H. PILDES, THE LAW
OF DEMOCRACY: LEGAL STRUCTURE OF THE POLITICAL PRocEss 662-63 (1998) (de-
scribing the 1997 version of the McCain-Feingold bill).37 See, e.g., Maine Clean Election Act, ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, §§ 1121-1128
(West. Supp. 1997) (adopting voluntary public financing conditioned upon a candidate's
acceptance of expenditure limitations, contribution limits of as low at $250 per election,
and restrictions on independent expenditures); Daggett v. Webster, 1999 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 17830 (D. Me. Nov. 5, 1999) (sustaining most of the Maine Act against a con-
stitutional challenge).
31 See Buckley, 519 F.2d at 821.39 See, e.g., E. JOSHUA ROSENKRANZ, BUCKLEY STOPS HERE: LOOSENING THE JUDI-
CIAL STRANGLEHOLD ON CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM (1998) (report by legal scholars
comprising the Twentieth Century Fund Working Group on Campaign Finance Litiga-
tion that describes how to persuade the Court to overrule Buckley).
4°See Colorado Republican Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 116 S. Ct. 2309, 2325-29
(1996) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part) (suggesting that
Buckley should be reconsidered to the extent that the decision permits the regulation of
campaign contributions). Note, however, that no other Justice joined that part of Justice
Thomas' opinion.
4' Shrink Missouri Government PAC v. Adams, 161 F.3d 519 (8th Cir. 1998), cert.
granted, 119 S. Ct. 901 (1999).
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prohibiting the contributing and spending of money for political
campaigns conflict with First Amendment values. 0
Proponents of campaign finance reform believe that the public
is on their side, 31 though some admit that the extent of the pub-
lic's enthusiasm is questionable.3 2 Campaign finance reform
ranked seventeenth and last in public concern according to a poll
released in July 1999.33 In any event, the anguish has produced
little actual federal legislation. The leading bill, sponsored by
Senators McCain (R-Ariz.) and Feingold (D-Wis.), would ban
soft money contributions to political parties, regulate campaign
advertisements funded by corporations and unions, and promote
increased disclosure and enforcement efforts.34 The leading
House bill, sponsored by Representatives Shays (R-Conn.) and
Meehan (D-Mass.), contains similar provisions.35 Presidential
30 There is an extensive literature on the constitutionality of campaign finance legis-
lation. Most writers acknowledge the First Amendment implications of spending and
contribution restrictions, including both those who oppose such restrictions, see, e.g.,
Smith, Money Talks, supra note 6, at 48-52, and those who favor them. See DANIEL
HAYS LOWENSTEIN, ELECTION LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 535 (1995) (noting that
"most defenders of reform have accepted the Court's conclusion that spending limits
need to be treated as speech limitations"). A notable exception is Judge J. Skelly
Wright, who wrote the lower court opinion upholding the FECA restrictions at issue in
Buckley, see Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821 (D.C. Cir. 1975), aff'd in part and rev'd in
part, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), and who later expressed his disagreement with the proposition
that such restrictions may violate the First Amendment. See J. Skelly Wright, Politics
and the Constitution: Is Money Speech?, 85 YALE L.J. 1001, 1012 (1976).
31 See 145 CONG. REC. H1306 (daily ed. Mar. 16, 1999) (statement of Rep. Udall (D-
Colo.)) (citing a New York Times survey showing that "9 out of 10 Americans think that
we ought to have significant campaign finance reform"); 144 CONG. REc. S 10155 (daily
ed. Sept. 10, 1998) (statement of Sen. Levin (D-Mich.)) (asserting that "[s]eventy-five
percent of the American people want campaign finance reform"); A New Speaker Errs
on Reform, supra note 10, at A16 (insisting that "voters are demanding an overhaul of a
corrupt system").32See 145 CONG. REC. H1305 (daily ed. Mar. 16, 1999) (statement of Rep. Udall (D-
N.M.)) (indicating that he has heard the comment that there is no popular support for
campaign finance reform "over and over again"); id. at H1307 (statement of Rep. Baird
(D-Wash.)) (admitting that campaign finance is "an issue which, if we ask pollsters,
they will tell us it does not poll high"); 144 CONG. REc. S10148 (daily ed. Sept. 10,
1998) (statement of Sen. Snowe (R-Me.)) (acknowledging that "some have said that the
American people actually aren't very concerned about this issue").
33 See Public Opinion Online, July 29, 1999, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Wires File (providing responses to the question "what one issue would you most like to
hear presidential candidates talk about next year").
34See S. 26, 106th Cong., 1st Sess. (1999); see also Summary of the McCain-
Feingold Campaign Finance Reform Bill (visited Aug. 11, 1999) <http://www.senate.
gov/-feingold/cfrsumn.html> (providing Senator Feingold's summary of the provi-
sions of the bill).35See H.R. 417, 106th Cong., 1st Sess. (1999); see also Shays-Meehan Bipartisan
Campaign Finance Reform Act Short Summary (visited Aug. 11, 1999)
<http://www.house.gov/shays/reform/cfr3526-sum.htm> (providing Representative
Shays' summary of the provisions of the bill).
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comes, the greater the intellectual exertion expended in its pur-
suit."42
Once these objections are combined, the outlook for campaign
finance reform is none too promising. The proposed campaign
finance legislation may well be misguided, it is doubtful whether
it will be enacted, and it will probably continue to be held un-
constitutional in any event.
I. MONEY AND OFFICIALS IN THE EXECUTIVE AND JUDICIAL
BRANCHES
Meanwhile, officials in other parts of the government perform
their duties without similar controversy. Federal judges may own
stock in any corporation they wish. The Secretary of Energy can
own stock in Exxon. An attorney in the Department of Justice
may enjoy a lunch paid for by a friend who is a partner with a
leading Washington law firm. But these officials cannot then
work on any matters involving the corporation or individuals
with whom they have that kind of connection.
Federal statutes prohibit government officials from participat-
ing in any matters in which they have a financial interest. Ex-
ecutive branch employees are prohibited from participating in
any matter in which they or their family have a financial inter-
est.43 An official who transgresses that statute faces the possibil-
ity of spending up to five years in prison." The federal conflict
of interest statutes, however, do not prohibit the financial inter-
ests as such. Judges, prosecutors and bureaucrats can hold what-
ever stock or other financial interests they please; they just can-
not work on any official matters that relate to those interests.
Legislators must abide by similar constraints. House and Sen-
ate rules require a member to recuse from any legislative busi-
ness in which the member has a personal financial interest.45
42 Sullivan, supra note 6, at 311. For other images of the failed efforts at campaign
finance reform, see Robert Post, Regulating Election Speech Under the First Amend-
ment, 77 Tax. L. REV. 1837 (1999) (remarking that "[c]ampaign finance reform has
become the Vietnam of First Amendment theory and doctrine," or more accurately, "it
has become the Kosovo, since the beneficence of our intentions in the latter case is so
much more apparent"); Isscharoff & Karlan, supra note 4, at 1705 (stating that
"[e]lectoral reform is a graveyard of well-intentioned plans gone awry").
43 See 18 U.S.C. § 208 (1994).
4 See 18 U.S.C. § 216(a)(2) (1994).
41 See H.R. R. 11I(1) (providing that "[e]very Member shall be present within the Hall
of the House during its sittings, unless excused or necessarily prevented, and shall vote
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Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott recused (R-Miss.) in part
from involvement in the tobacco legislation considered by Con-
gress in 1998 because his brother-in-law was a lead attorney for
the plaintiffs in the consolidated state litigation being reviewed
by Congress.46 Pending litigation, business ownerships, and the
work of a senator's wife on a matter have prompted other mem-
bers of Congress to recuse from involvement in particular legis-
lation.47 State legislators are subject to similar rules requiring
recusal whenever they have a special financial or personal inter-
est in a matter before the legislature. 48
Such examples, though, are not precisely analogous to the is-
sues raised by campaign contributions. The conflict of interest
problems described above involve the permissibility of actions
taken by a current government official. Campaign contributions,
on each question put, unless he has a direct personal or pecuniary interest in the event
of such question"); S. R. XII (describing the procedure by which a Senator may be
excused from voting on a question and permitting a Senator to decline to vote "on any
matter when he believes that his voting on such a matter would be a conflict of inter-
est").
46See 144 CONG. REc. S6434 (daily ed. June 17, 1998) (statement of Sen. Ashcroft
(R-Mo.)) (noting that Senator Nickles (R-Okla.) was managing the proposed tobacco
legislation because Senator Lott "has recused himself in large measure from this con-
sideration"). Senator Lott was criticized for not completely withdrawing from any par-
ticipation on tobacco related matters. See Alison Mitchell, Lott, On Sidelines, Remains
Key Player on Tobacco Bill, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 1998, at A26. President Clinton did
not recuse himself from involvement in the tobacco legislation even though his own
brother-in-law had an interest similar to that of Senator Lott's brother-in-law. See Ed
Henry, Majority Leader Recused Himselffrom Tobacco Deal, But What Does it Mean?,
ROLL CALL, Sept. 22, 1997.
47 See, e.g., 143 CONG. REc. E1248 (daily ed. June 18, 1997) (statement of Rep.
Campbell (R-Cal.)) (stating that he will recuse from "debating, commenting upon and
voting on USIA funding for my wife's specific program" to open a business school in
Russia); 141 CONG. REC. S17982 (daily ed. Dec. 5, 1995) (statement of Sen. Bond (R-
Mo.)) (indicating that he will recuse from proceedings on securities litigation reform
legislation because he is "engaged in securities litigation of the kind this legislation
seeks to reform"); 102 CONG. REC. S7303 (daily ed. June 2, 1992) (statement of Sen.
Kohl (D-Wis.)) (noting that he recused himself from participating in the debate on a
sports gambling bill because of his ownership of the Milwaukee Bucks basketball
team); Ronald M. Levin, Congressional Ethics and Constituent Advocacy in an Age of
Mistrust, 95 MIcH. L. REv. 1, 13 n.36 (1996) (noting that Senator Bingaman (D-N.M.)
recused himself from the Ethics Committee's proceedings in the Keating Five case
because his wife had worked for associates of Senator Cranston (D-Cal.), one of the
targets of the investigation).48 See George F. Carpinello, Should Practicing Lawyers Be Legislators?, 41 HAST-
INGS L.J. 87, 92-93 (1989) (stating that "[w]hen a legislator directly benefits in a
unique way from a particular piece of legislation... the legislator generally is expected
to announce his or her involvement and to recuse from any further involvement with the
legislation"); see also id. at 113-14 n.92 (quoting state statutes and rules requiring
legislatures to recuse from involvement in legislation in which they have a conflict of
interest). For a discussion and occasional criticism of the rules requiring recusal, see
ROSENTHAL, supra note 7, at 84-93.
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by contrast, are intended to help decide who will serve in the
government in the first place. The best analogy, then, considers
efforts to influence who will be chosen to serve as a federal
judge, the Secretary of Energy, or an attorney in the Justice De-
partment. For example, suppose that Exxon believes that its pet
offshore oil project would receive a more favorable hearing if the
Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency names
Attorney Oil to serve as her assistant administrator for water. To
encourage that choice, Exxon gives $10,000,000 to the Admin-
istrator. This is a bribe within the meaning of the federal crimi-
nal law. 49 In other words, the law forces executive branch
officials and employees to choose between money and their
work. Legislators, however, are allowed to choose both.
Il. A RECUSAL REQUIREMENT FOR THE RECIPIENTS OF
CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS
The conflict of interest rules applicable to the work of gov-
ernment officials suggest a route around the obstacles to cam-
paign finance reform. Allow contributors to give whatever they
want to political candidates, but require any successful candi-
dates to recuse themselves from voting on or participating in any
legislation or other matters that affects those contributors. For
example, Exxon can contribute whatever it wants to Senator Oil,
but if he accepts the company's money, Senator Oil cannot have
any involvement in any legislation or other congressional busi-
ness that would affect Exxon.
Such a prohibition would have either of two results. On the
one hand, if Exxon realizes that it will not be able to count on
49 See 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(1)(A) (making it illegal to give anything of value to a public
official for an official act to be performed by that official); see also infra at text accom-
panying notes 50-53 (discussing the bribery statute). The hardest case under the federal
statutes would occur if Exxon instead gives the money to Attorney Oil, who then uses
the money to wage a "campaign" to be named to the assistant administrator post.
Exxon's provision of the money to Attorney Oil would not be illegal because Attorney
Oil is neither a public official nor one "selected to be a public official." But Attorney
Oil would violate the statute if in the course of his "campaign" he used some of
Exxon's money to give, offer or promise anything of value to the EPA Administrator (or
any other government official), and arguably Exxon would be liable, too, if the com-
pany knew that is what Attorney Oil planned to do. If Attorney Oil spent the money in
other ways, e.g., buying TV ads promoting his appointment, he would not violate the
statute, but it is doubtful that such spending offers a useful way to secure a federal ap-
pointment. But cf. Michael Stokes Paulsen, Straightening Out The Confirmation Mess,
105 YALE L.J. 549, 577-78 (1995) (advocating organized campaigns for and against
federal judicial nominees).
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Senator Oil's support when the Clean Gasoline Act is debated in
Congress, then Exxon may be less inclined to contribute to
Senator Oil in the first place. Indeed, Exxon may lose a vote it
would have otherwise had if Senator Oil was predisposed to
support Exxon's position. On the other hand, if Exxon decides
that it wants to contribute the money to Senator Oil anyway, and
the Senator accepts it, then Exxon must be doing so for reasons
besides an allegedly corrupt effort to sway the Senator to act in a
certain fashion.
Likewise, the recusal requirement would impact candidates for
elected office in one of two ways. If Senator Oil accepts Exxon's
money, then Senator Oil will not be able to participate in matters
involving the Clean Gasoline Act. If Exxon contributes to the
campaigns of enough senators, and if enough Senators make that
choice, then we are faced with the not entirely appealing specta-
cle of the fate of the Clean Gasoline Act being decided by a 5-4
vote of the senators who have not recused. And if Senator Oil
accepts enough contributions from enough different contributors,
then Senator Oil will not be too busy with legislative work in
Washington, and he will presumably have to explain his idleness
to many skeptical constituents who thought they were voting for
someone to represent them in the legislative deliberations in the
Senate. On the other hand, if Senator Oil does not accept
Exxon's money, then he will be free to vote on the Clean Gaso-
line Act and anything else, but he will then be faced with the
need to collect sufficient money to fund his campaign to be
elected Senator in the first instance. If Senator Oil refuses all
contributions in order to avoid the recusal prohibition, then the
financial picture for his campaign becomes very bleak indeed.
The recusal requirement may seem drastic at first, but cam-
paign contributions can already have more ominous conse-
quences than mandated recusal. The federal bribery statute may
be applied to a member of Congress who participates in a matter
affecting a campaign contributor. The standard components of
bribery statutes are: (1) a public official is involved; (2) the de-
fendant has a corrupt intent; (3) the public official must gain
anything of value; (4) there is a relationship between the thing of
value and an official act; and (5) the relationship involves an in-
tent to influence the public official regarding the official act.5 0
50 See 18 U.S.C. § 201 (1994) (federal statute prohibiting bribery); Daniel H. Lowen-
stein, Political Bribery and the Intermediate Theory of Politics, 32 UCLA L. REV. 784,
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Numerous cases have held or assumed that campaign contribu-
tions can fit within such federal or state statutory definitions of
bribery.5' Indeed, Daniel Lowenstein has concluded that "[u]nder
most bribery statutes as they have been interpreted by most
courts, most special interest campaign contributions are
bribes" 52 Simply claiming that something is a campaign contri-
bution instead of a bribe does not make it so; the reported cases
contain numerous examples of bribery defendants who protested
that the contested money was a permissible campaign contribu-
tion rather than an impermissible bribe.53
Recusal even seems modest in comparison to the other sanc-
tions that could be imposed on a member of Congress whose
votes seem dictated by the campaign contributions that he or she
receives. The penalty for violating the federal bribery statute can
be as high as fifteen years in prison.5 At least one judge has had
to defend against a federal civil rights action filed by a litigant
who claimed that the judge violated her due process rights by
failing to recuse from a case involving a campaign contributor.5
And prison or civil liability might not be the worst fate that
could befall a legislator who is judged to be corrupt. 6
796-97 (1985) (listing the components of typical bribery statutes). See generally JOHN
T. NOONAN, JR., BRIBES (1984) (comprehensive study of the concept of bribery). Other
statutes define the lesser included offense of giving or receiving an illegal gratuity. See
Lowenstein, supra, at 796-97 (comparing illegal gratuity provisions with bribery provi-
sions).
5' See, e.g., United States v. Derrick, 163 F.3d 799, 815-17 (4th Cir. 1998); Jackson,
72 F.3d at 1373; United States v. Tomblin, 46 F.3d 1369, 1379 (5th Cir. 1995); United
States v. Allen, 10 F.3d 405, 410-11 (7th Cir. 1993); United States v. Bailey, 990 F.2d
119, 124 (4th Cir. 1993); see also Lowenstein, supra note 50, at 808 & nn.86-88 (1985
article citing numerous cases holding or assuming that a campaign contribution can
qualify as a bribe).
52Lowenstein, supra note 50, at 828; accord Note, Campaign Contributions and Fed-
eral Bribery Law, 92 HARV. L. REv. 451, 452 (1978) (acknowledging that campaign
contributions are problematic "under a literal reading of the federal bribery statute").
Even one Senator admitted that "[t]he distinction between a campaign contribution and
a bribe is almost a hairline's difference" 120 CONG. REc. 10351 (1974) (remarks of
Sen. Inouye quoting Sen. Long). See generally NOONAN, supra note 50, at 621-651
(chapter entitled "the donations of democracy").
53 See, e.g., Derrick, 163 F.3d at 815-17; Tomblin, 46 F.3d at 1379; United States v.
Mokol, 957 F.2d 1410 (7th Cir. 1992).
18 U.S.C. § 201(b) (Supp. V 1999). The penalty for bribery can also include a fine
of up to three times the amount of the bribe and disqualification from any future federal
office. See id.
55See Sheperdson v. Nigro, 5 F. Supp. 2d 305 (E.D. Pa. 1998) (rejecting the due proc-
ess claim and admonishing the plaintiff pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 for ignoring the
judge's immunity from suit).56 Cf United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of California, 526 U.S. 398, 119 S. Ct.
1402, 1404 (1999) (Scalia, J.) (observing that "Talmudic sages believed that judges who
accepted bribes would be punished by eventually losing all knowledge of the divine
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My proposed recusal requirement prevents both corruption
and the appearance of corruption. Rather than seeking to do so
indirectly by controlling the flow of money, it responds directly
by eliminating any opportunity for campaign contributions to
influence a senator or representative's votes or other activities
involving any business before Congress. Campaign contributions
cannot corrupt if the recipient is no more able to influence the
contributor's legislative agenda than anyone else in the public at
large. Nor would the appearance of corruption remain once the
disqualifying effect of a contribution becomes known.
This proposal also avoids the First Amendment problems
posed by restrictions on campaign contributions and expendi-
tures. Anyone can contribute any amount to a1iy candidate. What
they cannot do, though, is make such a contribution in the hope
of encouraging the candidate to support their legislative agenda
once in Congress. The constitutional objection to such a recusal
requirement is hard to construct. There is no First Amendment
right to bribery. Speech may be used to try to persuade an
elected official to support a cause; money may not.57 Nor has the
First Amendment been read to limit the application of bribery
laws to campaign contributions. Several convicted campaign
contributors and lobbyists have asserted that the First Amend-
ment imposes a quid pro quo requirement on bribery statutes,
but the courts have refused to impose such a constitutional limit
on what qualifies as bribery.8
To require a member of Congress to recuse from any matters
affecting a campaign contributor is both a direct response to
charges of apparent corruption and a straightforward extension
of existing recusal practices and bribery law. Nonetheless, it may
law").
57See, e.g., State v. Agan, 384 S.E.2d 863, 867 (Ga. 1989) (explaining that citizens
"have every right to try to influence their public officers-through petition and protest,
promises of political support and threats of political reprisal. They do not have, nor
have they every had, the 'right' to buy the official act of a public officer"), quoted in
Agan v. Vaughn, 119 F.3d 1538, 1544 (11th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1023
(1998).
51 See United States v. Jackson, 72 F.3d 1370, 1375-76 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied,
517 U.S. 1157 (1996); United States v. Cleveland, No. 96-207, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
5060, at *20-*27 (E.D. La. 1997); see also Agan, 119 F.3d at 1542-45 (rejecting an-
other First Amendment objection to the bribery conviction of a campaign contributor);
United States v. Allen, 10 F.3d 405, 410-12 (7th Cir. 1993) (discussing the question but
finding it unnecessary to answer it). Of course, it is permissible for a bribery statute to
impose a quid pro quo requirement, see, e.g., McCormick v. United States, 500 U.S.
257 (1991), but no case decided since McCormick holds that a bribery statute must
contain such an element.
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have occurred to you by now that my modest little proposal pre-
sents a few difficulties. Let me try to address several of them in
turn.
A. The Validity of Legislation Supported by a Legislator Who
Should have Recused
In the judicial context, the standard remedy for a judge's
wrongful failure to recuse from a case is to repeat the affected
proceedings: hold a new trial, resentence a defendant before a
different judge, or rehear the appeal." The transposition of that
approach into the legislative context would mandate a new vote
on a bill whenever a senator or representative fails to recuse de-
spite the interests of a campaign contributor. The invalidation of
legislation because of the subsequent disqualification of one of
its supporters is not unprecedented, 6° but such a rule would pres-
-9 See, e.g., United States v. Greenspan, 26 F.3d 1001, 1007 (10th Cir. 1994) (ordering
the resentencing of a defendant after a judge failed to recuse himself from sentencing
despite receiving a death threat); Cool Light Co., Inc. v. GTE Prods. Corp., 832 F.
Supp. 449, 460 (D. Mass. 1993) (describing a new trial before another judge as "the
classic remedy" for a trial judge's improper failure to recuse); Regional Sales Agency,
Inc. v. Reichert, 830 P.2d 252, 253-58 (Utah 1992) (vacating a court of appeals deci-
sion and ordering a rehearing because one of the appellate judges was related by mar-
riage to two members of the plaintiff's law firm). In other instances, though, the judge's
decisions may stand even though the judge should have recused. See generally Liljeberg
v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 862-70 (1988) (describing the factors
to be considered when deciding the remedy for a federal judge's improper failure to
disqualify from a case); United States v. Cerceda, 172 F.3d 806 (11th Cir. 1999) (en
banc) (applying Liljeberg and holding that a trial judge's improper failure to recuse
himself from several cases did not necessitate vacating the judgments and sentences in
those cases).
6 There are a few cases in which a city council's zoning decision was invalidated be-
cause one of the council members possessed a conflict of interest. See Lagrange City
Council v. Hall Bros. Co. of Oldham County, Inc., No. 1998-CA-000181-MR, 1999 Ky.
App. LEXIS 83 (Ky. Ct. App. July 23, 1999); Fleming v. City of Tacoma, 502 P.2d 327
(Wash. 1972); see also Griswold v. City of Homer, 925 P.2d 1015 (Alaska 1996) (re-
manding for a determination of whether a zoning ordinance should be invalidated be-
cause of the improper participation of a city council member who had a conflict of in-
terest). The majority rule in zoning cases does not require recusal in such instances, let
alone invalidation of the resulting action. See JOHN P. DWvER & PETER S. MENELL,
PROPERTY LAW AND POLICY: A COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIvE 1021
(1998) (explaining that "[o]nly a few courts, however, require recusal of legislative
officials who may have a conflict of interest, absent a statute prohibiting conflicts of
interest for such officials). Zoning is viewed as combining features of legislative, ad-
ministrative and judicial decisionmaking, so even those cases supporting the invalida-
tion of a zoning decision have emphasized that a similar rule need not follow for all
legislative determinations. See Fleming, 502 P.2d at 330-31 (stating that "zoning
amendments or zoning reclassifications are sufficiently distinguishable from other leg-
islative functions that an exception to the general rule [against inquiring into the mo-
tives of legislative officials] is desirable").
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ent substantial practical challenges. Instead, the recusal rule
should be enforced prospectively in conjunction with contribu-
tion disclosure requirements. The burden for seeking recusal
should be placed on anyone who believes that a legislative mat-
ter affects a contributor to a particular senator or representative.
Federal law already requires that campaign contributions be dis-
closed.61 Armed with this information, a careful analysis of pro-
posed legislation can usually reveal which contributors stand to
benefit or suffer from it, and anyone who contends that the re-
cusal of a particular senator or representative is necessary could
inform the House or Senate ethics committee. Those committees
could then decide whether to order the recusal of the legislator.
Failure to seek recusal before the legislative action takes place
would waive any claim for recusal, just as belated motions for
recusal are rejected in the judicial context.62
But a retroactive remedy is necessary to deter legislators who
manage to escape a forced recusal even though they know that
their campaign contributors will benefit from particular legisla-
tion. The identification of which contributors stand to benefit
from a proposed bill is not always easy, especially if the scope of
the bill is changed at the last minute. Timely recusal motions
become virtually impossible when Congress legislates on the
floor of the House or Senate. The appropriate response in such
circumstances is directed not at the validity of the legislation,
but instead at the conduct of the legislator. A member of Con-
gress who knowingly participates in a matter that affects a cam-
paign contributor should be required to repay the amount of the
contribution received. The money should go to the federal treas-
ury-or even to the national committee of the opposing political
party-rather than being returned to the contributor. The sanc-
61 See 2 U.S.C. § 434 (Supp. 1111997); see generally Campaign Finance Reports and
Data (visited Aug. 12, 1999) <http:llwww.fee.gov/1996/sdrindex.htm> (FEC web site
containing campaign finance reports); Leslie Wayne, Following the Money, Through the
Web, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 1999, at GI (finding that "[tihe Internet is making it easy for
journalists, competing candidates and ordinary citizens to connect the dots between
politicians and their sources of money").
62 See, e.g., Polizzi v. United States, 926 F.2d 1311, 1321 (2d Cir. 1991); Parker v.
State, 486 S.E.2d 687, 691 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997); State v. Bordelon, 75 So. 429, 431 (La.
1917); MacCormick v. MacCormick, 513 A.2d 266, 267 (Me. 1986); State v. Keene,
693 N.E.2d 246, 263 (Ohio 1998); State v. Hoeft, 594 N.W.2d 323, 326 (S.D. 1999);
Pena v. Pena, 986 S.W.2d 696, 700-01 (Tex. App. 1998); see generally Richard C. Tin-
ney, Annotation, Waiver or Loss of Right to Disqualify Judge by Participation in Pro-
ceedings-Modern State Civil Cases, 24 A.L.R. 4th 870, 877-79 (1983) (summarizing
the rules concerning waiver of an objection to a judge's failure to recuse from a case).
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tion for repeat violators who knowingly participate in legislation
for which they should have recused because of a campaign con-
tribution should be consideration for expulsion from Congress. 63
B. Elected Judges Do Not Have to Recuse from Cases Involving
Campaign Contributors
Many state court judges are elected, and like aspiring mem-
bers of Congress, they rely upon campaign contributions to fund
activities designed to persuade the electorate to vote for them.
Once elected, judges occasionally find themselves hearing a case
in which one of their campaign contributors is representing one
of the parties, or even where the party himself or herself was a
contributor. Not surprisingly, the opposing party often moves to
recuse the judge in such circumstances. Surprisingly, such mo-
tions hardly ever succeed. 61
63 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2 (providing that "[ejach House may determine the
Rules of its Proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly Behaviour, and, with the
Concurrence of two thirds, expel a Member"); see also United States v. Brewster, 408
U.S. 501, 519 n.13 (1972) ("'The right to expel extends to all cases where the offence is
such as in the judgment of the Senate is inconsistent with the trust and duty of a mem-
ber."') (quoting In re Chapman, 166 U.S. 661, 669-70 (1897)). Powell v. McCormack is
no obstacle to expulsion because the Court there considered only the exclusion of Adam
Clayton Powell from the House, explicitly expressing no view on any potential consti-
tutional questions regarding expulsion. See 395 U.S. 486, 507 n.27 (1969).
6 4See Shepherdson v. Nigro, 5 F. Supp. 2d 305 (E.D. Pa. 1998) (holding that recusal
was not required when the law firm representing the defendant had contributed to the
judge's campaign); Ex parte The Kenneth D. McLeod, Sr. Family Ltd. Partnership XV,
725 So. 2d 271 (Ala. 1998) (holding that recusal was not required when the defendant
had contributed $200 to the trial judge's campaign for the appellate court); Velarde v.
Osborn, No. 37789-2-I, 1997 Wash. App. LEXIS 1404 (Wash. Ct. App. Aug. 25, 1997)
(holding that a judge need not recuse despite receiving a $100 campaign contribution
from the defendant); Aguilar v. Anderson, 855 S.W.2d 799 (Tex. App. 1993) (holding
that recusal was not required when the judge solicited a $300 campaign contribution
from the plaintiff's law firm); Keane v. Andrews, 555 So. 2d 940 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1990) (holding that a trial judge need not recuse from a case despite receiving $500
campaign contributions from several members of an attorney's firm); J-IV Investments
v. David Lynn Machine, Inc., 784 S.W.2d 106 (Tex. App. 1990) (holding that recusal
was not required when a judge accepted a $500 campaign contribution from the defen-
dant's attorney); Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil, Co., 729 S.W.2d 768, 844-45 (Tex. App.
1987) (refusing to order the recusal of a trial judge who received a $10,000 campaign
contribution from Pennzoil's lead counsel two days after the company filed its answer),
cert. dismissed, 485 U.S. 994 (1988); River Road Neighborhood Ass'n v. South Texas
Sports, Inc., 673 S.W.2d 952 (Tex. App. 1983) (holding that the recusal of two justices
was not required when the attorneys representing the appellant accounted for about
20% of each justice's campaign contributions); Rocha v. Ahmad, 662 S.W.2d 77 (Tex.
App. 1983) (holding that the recusal of two judges was not required when the attorney
representing the appellees had contributed several thousand dollars to both judges'
campaigns and had held election victory celebrations for them at his offices); Raybon v.
Burnette, 135 So.2d 228 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1961) (concluding that a trial judge need
88 Harvard Journal on Legislation [Vol. 37
The courts offer several reasons for why a judge need not re-
cuse from a case in which a campaign contributor serves as
counsel for one of the parties. They deny that a reasonable ob-
server would view a judge as biased when deciding a case in-
volving a campaign contributor. 5 They see it as an inevitable
consequence of judicial elections.66 It would be impractical, they
say, for a judge to have to choose between running an un-
derfinanced campaign and having to recuse from lots of cases
involving attorneys who contributed to the campaign. 67
These decisions are not especially popular among the writers
who have considered them. Indeed, the scholarly opinion is just
as unanimous that a campaign contribution should require a
judge to recuse as the courts are agreed that recusal is unneces-
sary.68 The academic writings and the occasional dissenting
not recuse from a case where the defendant's attorney contributed to the judge's cam-
paign and the plaintiff's attorney contributed to the judge's opponent); Coker v. Harris,
281 S.W.2d 100 (Tex. App. 1955) (affirming the denial of motion to recuse a judge who
had received campaign contributions from the attorneys representing both sides in the
case). Recusal is not even required when a judge contributes to the political campaign
of an attorney appearing before him. See Frade v. Costa, 171 N.E.2d 863 (Mass. 1961).
6 See Aguilar, 855 S.W.2d at 802 (opinion of Larsen, J.) (noting that "Texas courts
have repeatedly rejected the notion that a judge's acceptance of campaign contributions
from lawyers creates bias necessitating recusal, or even an appearance of impropriety");
id. at 805 (Osborn, C.J., concurring) (stating that "I do not believe the 'reasonable per-
son on the street' would conclude that receipt of a $100 contribution or even a $500
contribution, with today's standards and cost of campaigns, would result in a trial judge
being biased or prejudiced"); Breakstone v. MacKenzie, 561 So. 2d 1164, 1174 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (Nesbitt, J., dissenting) (concluding that "a contribution of $1,000
or less made by a litigant or his counsel to the political campaign of a trial judge or the
judge's spouse does not create a legally sufficient basis for a reasonable person to fear a
bias by the trial judge in favor of the contributing side"), vacated in part, 571 So. 2d 32
(Fla. 1990); but see infra note 71.
66See Breakstone, 561 So. 2d at 1176 (Nesbitt, J., dissenting) (insisting that
"[b]ecause it is the people's desire that trial judges submit to contested elections, I do
not find that the people have a reasonable expectation that they can be free of all of the
necessary evils that attend such an election").
67 See Aguilar, 855 S.W.2d at 814 (Barajas, ., dissenting) (contending that "if the
trial judge tries to preserve his or her integrity and maintain an appearance of imparti-
ality by refusing to raise funds, the election is destined to be lost"); Breakstone, 561 So.
2d at 1179 n.4 (Schwartz, C.J., dissenting) (describing the "chilling effect" of manda-
tory recusal on judicial campaign contributions from lawyers); Rocha, 662 S.W.2d at 78
(opining that "[a] candidate for the bench who relies solely on contributions from non-
lawyers must reconcile himself to staging a campaign on something less than a shoe-
string. If a judge cannot sit on a case in which a contributing lawyer is involved as
counsel, judges who have been elected would have to recuse themselves in perhaps a
majority of the cases filed in their courts:').
61 See Bradley A. Siciliano, Note, Attorney Contributions in Judicial Campaigns:
Creating the Appearance of Impropriety, 20 HOFSTRA L. REv. 217 (1991); Stuart Ban-
ner, Note, Disqualifying Elected Judges from Cases Involving Campaign Contributors,
40 STAN. L. REv. 449 (1988); Mark Andrew Grannis, Note, Safeguarding the Litigant's
Constitutional Right to a Fair and Impartial Forum: A Due Process Approach to Im-
proprieties Arising from Judicial Campaign Contributions from Lawyers, 86 MIcH. L.
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judges dispute the practical effects of requiring recusal.69 More
importantly, the critics of these decisions emphasize that the in-
tegrity of the system-the avoidance of the appearance of cor-
ruption, if you will-overrides any of those other concerns. As
one court put it, "[t]he overriding priority ... is to assure that
our courts are impartial, and that they have the appearance of
impartiality' 70 Many writers-and some judges-submit that
campaign contributions provide the appearance that a judge is
not impartial, regardless of whether or not such bias actually
exists.
These critics have the better argument. The practical argu-
ments regarding the implementation of a recusal requirement are
not without force, but accepting them consigns a poor litigant to
the disturbing spectacle of having her case decided by a judge
who holds office in part because of the financial generosity of
the attorney for the opposing party.72 One could reasonably con-
clude that an attorney's $10,000 campaign contribution to the
REv. 382 (1987); see also Breakstone, 561 So. 2d at 1168 n.6 (listing numerous bar
journal and other articles criticizing the decisions allowing judges to decide cases in-
volving campaign contributors).
69 See Breakstone, 561 So. 2d at 1172 (responding that "[t]o suggest that a candidate's
friends and supporters will fail to assist at a substantial level through fear of possible
disqualification of the judge on motion in future cases (thus running the risk that the
opposition will instead be elected) defies both logic and experience"); id. at 1174
(Ferguson, J., concurring) (claiming that "[i]n all likelihood today's decision [requiring
recusal] will no more trouble the present system than a teardrop in Biscayne Bay").701d. at 1172.
71 See Ex parte Bryant, 675 So. 2d 552, 556 (Ala. Crim. App. 1996) (Cobb, J., dis-
senting) (suggesting that a person of ordinary prudence could question the judge's im-
partiality even if it is the contributing attorney who seeks the judge's recusal); Aguilar,
855 S.W. 2d at 814-16 (Barajas, J., dissenting) (asserting that receipt of campaign con-
tributions can sometimes eliminate the appearance that a judge is impartial); Norman
Krivosha, Acquiring Judges by the Merit Selection Method: The Case for Adopting
Such a Method, 40 Sw. L.J. 15, 19 (1986) (statement by Nebraska's Chief Justice that
"[o]ne may be the most ethical individual in the world and, yet, if one must seek funds
as the other two branches of government do when running for office, one inevitably
creates the appearance of impropriety"); Siciliano, supra note 68, at 227 (questioning
the motives of campaign contributors in light of the substantial contributions that are
made to judicial candidates who are running unopposed, or who are sure to win, or who
have already won their election).
72 See Aguilar, 855 S.W. 2d at 815 (Barajas, J., dissenting) (noting that the realities of
judicial elections are "not comforting to the single mother of five, unable to afford
counsel of her choice for the purpose of enforcing child-support obligations, who dis-
covers that opposing counsel attorney made a financial contribution to the judge's ree-
lection campaign"); Breakstone v. MacKenzie, 561 So. 2d 1164, 1168 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1989) (asserting that "[c]ertainly the ordinary litigant does not make, or have the
financial capacity to make, a $500 contribution" and concluding that such a contribu-
tion could cause a reasonable person to fear that the judge would not be impartial),
vacated in part, Breakstone, 565 So. 2d at 1332. The decisions refusing to mandate
recusal include a disturbing number of instances where the disadvantaged party was in
particularly dire straits.
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judge who is handling his case creates a fair question about the
ability of the judge to decide a case according to the law, not the
money.73 That the courts say otherwise suggests that they per-
ceive corruption differently than most others do. If the popular
perception of the corrupting influence of campaign contributions
is correct, then the appropriate response is to extend the recusal
requirement to the judicial context, rather than imitating the
contrary judicial decisions in the legislative context.
C. The Type and Scope of Interests Subject to the Recusal
Requirement
Note that my description of the rule requires recusal whenever
a contributor has any interest in the matter before Congress, not
just when the contributor has a financial interest in the matter.
Many ethics statutes only apply to conflicts of interest arising
out of financial holdings.74 Such a limitation could be added
here, too, so that recusal is necessary only if a contributor stands
to benefit financially from how the legislator votes. The existing
standards for identifying when a member of Congress has a
financial interest could be employed to determine when a cam-
paign contributor has a financial interest. 75
But the concern about the influence of money on those who
receive it applies equally to funds given by people or organiza-
tions who make campaign contributions for non-economic rea-
sons. Suppose that Senator Oil accepted a million-dollar cam-
paign contribution from the Sierra Club, which reminds him of
its generosity on the day that the Clean Gasoline Act is before
the Senate. Senator Oil would seem to face the same dilemma-
vote in accordance with the desires of a contributor lest future
contributions be extinguished-that he would face if the con-
73 But see Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 729 S.W.2d 768, 842-45 (Tex. App. 1987)
(holding that a $10,000 campaign contribution to the judge who is hearing a party's
case does not create an appearance of impropriety).
74See 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(1) (1994) (prohibiting corrupt gifts of "anything of value"
to a public official).75 See S. R. XXXVII(4) (stating that "[n]o Member, officer, or employee shall know-
ingly use his official position to introduce or aid the progress or passage of legislation,
a principal purpose of which is to further only his pecuniary interest, only the pecuniary
interest of his immediate family, or only the pecuniary interest of a limited class of
persons or enterprises, when le, or his immediate family, or enterprises controlled by
them, are members of the affected class.'); H.R. R. 111(1) (requiring members to vote on
all questions unless the member has "a direct personal or pecuniary interest in the event
of such question").
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tributor had been Exxon instead. The desire to please a con-
tributor and encourage future contributions exists regardless of
what the contributor wants.
This approach, however, carries its own baggage. Once all in-
terests are relevant for purposes of determining whether recusal
is necessary, there must be some means of identifying the inter-
ests of a contributor. Other ethics rules require disqualification
based on non-financial interests, so the task is not unique.7 6 In
fact, there are a number of ways to ascertain an organization's
interests. An organization can be presumed to have an interest in
any legislation about which it has lobbied Congress or otherwise
taken a public position. More generally, an organization's stated
purposes can be consulted to determine whether proposed legis-
lation will affect the organization. For example, the Sierra Club's
web site contains sixty-seven stated policies on particular is-
sues.77 An examination of these policies confirms that the Sierra
Club would be interested in the Clean Gasoline Act while leav-
ing no basis for concluding that the organization is concerned
about funding for refuges in Kosovo. Accordingly, a member of
Congress who receives a campaign contribution from the Sierra
Club would have to recuse from the Clean Gasoline Act but not
from a bill to aid Kosovo refugees. To be sure, an organization
could try to prevent the application of the recusal requirement by
declining to lobby or post stated policies or otherwise explain its
views, but such measures would also make it difficult to support
the inference that the campaign contribution was given to
influence the member of Congress on particular legislation.
The scope of the recusal requirement can be tempered by lim-
iting its application to interests that are sufficiently substantial to
be viewed as likely to influence a legislator. The rules governing
76 See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (1994) (requiring a federal judge to "disqualify him-
self in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned");
OKLA. STAT. art. V, § 24 (1981) (requiring a legislator who has a "personal or private
interest" in a matter to recuse); CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, canon 3E(l)(c) (1999)
(requiring disqualification when a judge or a member of the judge's immediate family
holds "any other more than de minimis interest that could be substantially affected by
the proceeding" of a matter before the judge); Carpinello, supra note 48, at 113-14
n.92 (listing state rules requiring legislators to recuse from matters in which they have
certain interests); see also JEFFREY M. SHAMAN, STEVEN LUBET & JAMES J. ALFINI,
JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND ETHICS § 4.24 (2d ed. 1995) (noting the difficulties in apply-
ing Code of Judicial Conduct test); John H. Garvey & Amy V. Coney, Catholic Judges
in Capital Cases, 81 MARQ. L. REV. 303, 331-43 (1998) (arguing that Catholic judges
should recuse themselves in certain capital punishment proceedings but not others).
77 See Sierra Club Conservation Policies (visited Aug. 23, 1999) <http://www. sier-
raclub.org/policy/conservation/index.html>.
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financial interests are subject to tests of directness and proxim-
ity. Many state conflict of interest laws do not apply to interests
that are shared by a group, class or profession.78 Other rules in-
clude an exemption for de minimis interests.79 The recusal re-
quirement should contain similar exemptions so that a contribu-
tion from the Sierra Club, for example, would not mandate re-
cusal from defense spending appropriations even though the Si-
erra Club believes that "[i]nvestments in environmental security
should begin to replace new military expenditures."80
The hardest case arises when an individual makes a contribu-
tion for a non-economic reason. Suppose that Bill Gates contrib-
utes $1,000,000 to each Senate candidate who promises to sup-
port pro-choice policies, or that Nancy DeMoss contributes
$1,000,000 to each Senate candidate who promises to support
pro-life policies.8' Should the senators who received such contri-
butions have to recuse from any matters involving abortion?
Such contributions pose the same threats of corruption or appar-
ent corruption. A candidate is just as likely to be influenced by a
campaign contribution from an individual motivated by a non-
economic interest as by a contribution from a multinational cor-
poration. But it is more difficult to apply the recusal rule to indi-
78 See Carpinello, supra note 48, at 92 n.16 (citing state statutes and rules); see also
ROSENTHAL, supra note 7, at 94 (observing that "New Mexico lawmakers, like law-
makers elsewhere, are allowed to introduce legislation that benefits the class of citizens
to which they belong ... even though it may also benefit themselves"). The congres-
sional ethics rules contain a similar limitation, though its scope has been controversial.
See Elizabeth A. Palmer, Campbell Ethics Complaint Dismissed, 57 Cong. Q. 2772
(1999) (reporting that the Senate Ethics Committee concluded that Senator Campbell
(R-Colo.) had engaged in an apparent conflict of interest-but no violation of the ethics
rules-when he introduced legislation that would benefit 1,100 landowners including
himself).
79 See CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, canon 3E(l)(c) (1999); see also In re Virginia
Elec. & Power Co., 539 F.2d 357, 368-69 (4th Cir. 1976) (holding that a judge's $100
interest in a utility rate reduction was de minimis).
80 Environmental Security Policy (visited Aug. 23, 1999) <http:llwww.sierraclub.org/
policy/conservation/envsecurity.html>. The policy statement contains the qualification
that such spending changes should be "consistent with existing Club policies and
whenever feasible through arms control negotiations or other international agreements."
Id.
81 Cf David Van Biema, Who Are Those Guys?, TIME, Aug. 9, 1999, at 52 (noting that
Nancy DeMoss is the CEO of the Arthur S. DeMoss Foundation, which funds adver-
tisements opposing abortion); Jennifer Kabbany, Gates, Tycoons'Largess Aims to Curb
World's Birthrate, WASH. TIMES, Mar. 24, 1999, at A2 (reporting that "The William H.
Gates Foundation, which recently received $2.2 billion in Microsoft stock from Mr.
Gates, plans to give the majority to Planned Parenthood and other population control
agencies"). Note that these examples are different from my hypothetical to the extent
that they involve contributions by organizations rather than individuals, and they do not
involve political campaign contributions.
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vidual contributions. The interests of an individual can be much
more difficult to ascertain than the interests of a corporation or
other organization.82 Even when an individual's contribution is
motivated by a specific policy concern, it can be difficult to
prove the identity of that interest. Gates or DeMoss or any other
individual could avoid triggering the recusal requirement by
contributing money to a candidate without explaining why. But
the practical difficulties in determining when an individual's
campaign contribution should be the basis for the recusal of its
recipient are not substantial where the contribution can be fairly
characterized as corrupting because of its influence on the re-
cipient. The stated purpose of the contribution and other evi-
dence of its purpose can be consulted to determine the con-
tributor's interests, and thus, the scope of the recusal require-
ment. If the reason for the contribution remains unknown, then
there is little reason to fear that any corruption will result from
it.
D. Money Will Be Diverted to Other Means of Influencing the
Political and Legislative Process
Another worry about a recusal requirement is that it would en-
courage contributions to political parties or PACs instead of po-
litical candidates. The Supreme Court would probably not be too
concerned about contributions to parties because of the Court's
support for the role of political parties in the electoral process.83
But the large sums of money that have been contributed to po-
litical parties and PACs in recent years-so-called "soft money"
82 See, e.g., Mike Flaherty, Road Builders' Influence Criticized, Wis. ST. J., June 5,
1999, at 3B (reporting that campaign finance reform group characterized a family's
$32,263 campaign contributions as supportive of highway construction because the
family owns a cement business, while others attributed the contribution to the family's
support of an anti-abortion candidates).
83See, e.g., Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 367 (1997)
(holding that states have "a strong interest in the stability of their political systems' an
interest that "permits them to enact reasonable election regulations that may, in prac-
tice, favor the traditional two-party system"); Colorado Republican Campaign Comm.
v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604, 615-16 (1996) (plurality opinion of Breyer, J.) (stating that "[a]
political party's independent expression not only reflects its members' views about the
philosophical and governmental matters that bind them together, it also seeks to con-
vince others to join those members in a practical democratic task, the task of creating a
government that voters can instruct and hold responsible for subsequent success or
failure"); id. at 629-30 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part)
(extolling the role of political parties); see generally ISSACHAROFF, KARLAN & PILDES,
supra note 36, at 244-63 (discussing the entrenchment of the two-party system).
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because it is outside the FECA's restrictions on "hard" money
given directly to specific candidates-have been the focus of
many of the current campaign finance reform proposals. Alter-
natively, the organizations and individuals who now spend mil-
lions of dollars on campaign contributions will just shift their
spending to lobbying if such campaign contributions become
impossible or counterproductive because of the recusal require-
ment. Any effort to block the flow of money into lobbying would
confront constitutional constraints that are at least as demanding
as those applicable to campaign spending 4
There is no doubt that a recusal requirement will divert the
flow of money from candidates so that it reaches PACs, political
parties, lobbyists, or others instead. The applicability of the re-
cusal requirement depends upon what those entities do with the
money that they receive. If they make contributions of their own
to political candidates, then it would be easy to apply the recusal
requirement. For example, a legislator could be required to re-
cuse from any legislative business that affects the interests of a
PAC that has contributed to his or her campaign. This makes
sense in the context of PACs, whose interests can be identified in
the same manner as the interests of other organizations.
Besides making contributions, PACs also spend money to fur-
ther their own political objectives. Such spending is the object of
much of the wrath of campaign reformers, but it may not be
regulated if it is independent of a candidate's own campaign.
"Independent," moreover, has been broadly understood by the
courts as including any spending except that which is explicitly
coordinated with a candidate's campaign or which explicitly
supports or opposes a specific candidate. s5 But corruption, not
independence, determines whether or not recusal is necessary. If
campaign spending by PACs influences or appears to influence
how legislators vote in Congress because of the desire to benefit
14 See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS
ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 316-18 (2d ed.
1995) (discussing the constitutional constraints on the regulation of lobbying); Lisa A.
Kloppenberg, Avoiding Serious Constitutional Doubts: The Supreme Court's Construc-
tion of Statutes Raising Free Speech Concerns, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1, 77-90 (1996)
(explaining how the Court has narrowly construed lobbying regulations because of
constitutional concerns).
85 See, e.g., Colorado Republican Campaign Comm., 518 U.S. at 619-23 (holding that
a political party's spending is independent from, rather than coordinated with, the
party's candidate); FEC v. The Christian Coalition, 52 F. Supp. 2d 45 (D.D.C. 1999)
(holding that the distribution of voter's guides does not constitute prohibited express
advocacy of a candidate).
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from such spending in future campaigns, then the same reasons
for applying the recusal requirement to other campaign money
would justify its application to PAC spending.
It is more difficult to extend the recusal rule to money contrib-
uted to candidates by political parties, or to spending by parties
in support of candidates. Money given to political parties is not
as corrupting as money given directly to candidates. Votes on
laws in the United States Congress are cast by senators and rep-
resentatives, not by the Republican or Democratic Party. The
Republican Party can be influenced by a campaign contribution
from Exxon, and a Republican congressional candidate can be
financially dependent on the party, but the threat of corruption is
reduced by the existence of the party as an intermediary between
the contributor and the candidate. Both of the major political
parties include members of Congress who oppose the agendas of
the party's primary contributors, yet the contributors continue to
support the parties. The increased amount of money contributed
to political parties at a time when members of Congress show
increased independence from their parties suggests that more
money for political parties would not necessarily result in any
particular legislative outcomes. And even if a contribution is
seen as somehow corrupting the party, it is more difficult to
characterize the party's financial support for its own candidates
as corrupt. The Court's unwillingness to permit the regulation of
a political party's independent spending on its candidates shows
as much. 6
A similar result occurs if funds are diverted to lobbyists in-
stead of candidates. Lobbying does not present the same danger
1 See Colorado Republican Campaign Comm., 518 U.S. 604 (holding that the first
amendment prohibits the application of FECA's expenditure limits to money spent by a
political party without coordination with a candidate). The opinions in Colorado Re-
publican Campaign Committee reveal the Court's skepticism about the possibility that a
political party's spending could corrupt its candidates. See id. at 616 (plurality opinion
of Breyer, J.) (observing that "[t]he independent expression of a political party's views
is 'core' First Amendment activity no less than is the independent expression of indi-
viduals, candidates, or other political committees"); id. at 623 (suggesting that if a
party and its candidate are thought of as being identical then "one might argue that the
absolute identity of views and interests eliminates any potential for corruption"); id. at
630 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part) (stating that "[t]he
greater difficulty posed by the statute is its stifling effect on the ability of the party to
do what it exists to do"); id. at 646 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment and dis-
senting in part) (suggesting that "if the Democratic Party spends large sums of money
in support of a candidate who wins, takes office, and then implements the Party's plat-
form, that is not corruption; that is successful advocacy of ideas in the political market-
place and representative government in a party system.").
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of a corrupting quid pro quo relationship between a contributor
and a legislator. A legislator who ignores the pleas of a lobbyist
may face the ire of a company or group, but the consequences of
that ire are diminished dramatically by the recusal rule. The lob-
byist may want to support the legislator's opponent in the next
election, but any campaign contributions would render the oppo-
nent ineligible from supporting the contributor's interests in
Congress because of the recusal requirement. Without the tool of
campaign contributions as a threat, a legislator faces relatively
limited sanctions from a disappointed lobbyist. Conversely, lob-
bying is desirable because it is the means by which the people
express their views about particular legislation in a representa-
tive democracy. 7 Of course, lobbying can be abused, and it can
slip dangerously close to corruption in its own right. But other
statutes are available to control those excesses. Lobbying thus
offers a combination of lesser dangers and greater advantages
compared to the fears of corruption and apparent corruption ac-
companying campaign spending.
So where will the money that is now spent on campaign con-
tributions end up if the recusal rule is adopted? Much of it will
probably go to political parties and to lobbyists, and while their
spending presents problems of its own, it is less susceptible to
the charge of corruption that is so often leveled at campaign
contributions. Other funds might go to general educational ef-
forts to teach the public about the erstwhile contributor's point
of view. The studies of spending on ballot initiatives suggest that
the amount of money spent on such efforts increases the likeli-
hood that the public will be persuaded,88 but again, the charge of
corruption is harder to level because it views a particular out-
come as evidence that the people were corrupted themselves.
Finally, it is possible that money that was once spent on cam-
paign contributions will now be spent on different matters alto-
gether. Whatever those matters are, they will be preferable to
campaign contributions from the perspective of avoiding corrup-
tion or its appearance.89
87 See U.S. CONST. amend. I (prohibiting federal laws abridging the right "to petition
the Government for a redress of grievances").
88 See, e.g., Elizabeth Garrett, Who Directs Direct Democracy?, 4 U. Cm. L. ScH.
ROUNDTABLE 17, 22 (1997) (noting that "[a] handful of studies suggests that the
amount of money spent in a campaign is crucial in determining the outcome of the
vote").
s9 For additional speculation about the course that money would take if traditional
campaign finance proposals are adopted, see Issacharoff & Karlan, supra note 4, at
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E. The People Will Lose Their Representatives
A fifth concern about the recusal requirement assumes that
candidates will choose to accept contributions despite the pros-
pect of recusal. The practical effect of mandating recusal is to
deny the successful candidate's constituents representation in
Congress whenever the interests of the campaign contributors
are at issue." Recusal would become the norm rather than the
exception if enough candidates accepted contributions from
enough different sources. The recusal requirement could even be
used strategically by those opposed to a candidate who would
contribute to the candidate in order to force recusal, though the
success of that ploy could be defeated by the diligence of the
candidate.
Nevertheless, it is hard to imagine wholesale recusals. Con-
tributors are likely to vanish if forced recusal is the consequence
of a contribution. Even if contributors persist, the people them-
selves can ensure that their representative is not a frequent re-
cuser by not voting for a candidate who will be required to re-
cuse on issues of importance to the voters. This self-help remedy
will encourage candidates to avoid recusal by declining contri-
butions that would require it.
F. Campaigns Cannot Be Financed
The only remaining problem is how a candidate can collect the
funds needed to run a campaign once the recusal requirement
causes many of the existing sources of campaign contributions to
disappear. Campaigns are expensive, and there is little likelihood
that they will suddenly become cheap just because candidates
can no longer collect contributions. Without spending from po-
litical candidates, television stations will air advertisements for
other products, and pollsters and consultants will find other
businesses that are interested in their services. To avoid this re-
sult, candidates will turn to other means of funding campaigns.
1713-16 (worrying that money would be spent without the "mediating influence" of
political parties or candidates); Sullivan, supra note 6, at 321-22 (suggesting that
money will go to issue advocacy).
90 See ROSENTHAL, supra note 7, at 97 (objecting to a legislator's recusal from mat-
ters in which he or she might be accused of having a conflict of interest because "the
recused legislator's constituents are denied representation").
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Those candidates who possess substantial personal wealth will
still be able to run expensive campaigns. Then pressure for pub-
lic financing of campaigns may grow in response to the inability
of those who lack personal wealth to run for elected office.
The likely alternative means of financing campaigns present
the most serious objection to imposing a recusal requirement. I
am unaware of anyone who contends that the nation is well
served by limiting our choice of political candidates to those
who are sufficiently wealthy to pay for their own campaigns.
Nor is public financing especially appealing, for reasons that
others have already articulated.9' Nevertheless candidates still
need money to campaign for election.
The best solution would be to modify the recusal rule so that it
is not triggered by contributions below a certain amount. For ex-
ample, a candidate could be permitted to accept any contribu-
tions below $100 or $1,000 and still participate in legislative
matters affecting the contributor. The premise of the exception
would be that contributions below the stated amount neither cor-
rupt nor provide the appearance of corrupting the candidate who
receives them. In other words, a candidate who receives a host of
$1,000 contributions is unlikely to vote a certain way just be-
cause some of his or her contributors desire such a vote. Such a
threshold finds precedent in suggested solutions to the apparent
corruption attending campaign contributions in state judicial
elections. 92 Furthermore, a substantial amount of campaign funds
can be collected from individuals or organizations who contrib-
ute no more than $1,000 each. For example, about half of the
contributions received by 1998 Senate candidates came from in-
dividuals who gave no more than $1,000 each, with the New
York Senate race alone yielding nearly $25 million in individual
contributions. 93 The smaller donations encouraged by the
91 See, e.g., Sullivan, supra note 6, at 327-29; Smith, Faulty Assumptions, supra note
6, at 1084-86; David A. Strauss, What is the Goal of Campaign Finance Reform?, 1995
U. CHI. LEGAL F. 141, 156-57. The case for public financing is made in Jamin Raskin
& John Bonifaz, The Constitutional hnperative and Practical Superiority of Demo-
cratically Financed Elections, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 1160 (1994). For an overview of the
debate, see LOWENSTEIN, supra note 30, at 733-82.
92 See Banner, supra note 68, at 478-83 (proposing that judges should be required to
recuse themselves from any case involving an attorney who contributed more than
$1,000 to the judge's campaign); see also Breakstone v. MacKenzie, 561 So.2d 1163,
1170-71 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (declining to adopt that proposal because recusal
decisions involving campaign contributions must be made on a case-by-case basis).
93See 1997-98 Top 50 Senate-Contributions from Individuals (visited Aug. 10,
1999) <http:llwww.fec.gov/press/seind98.htm>.
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modified recusal rule may not fully fund increasingly expensive
election activities, but neither will they render elections the ex-
clusive province of the independently wealthy.
This would seem to solve the problem of providing a reason-
able source of money for election campaigns, except for one tiny
problem: it returns us full circle to the status quo. Federal law
already limits individual campaign contributions to $1,000.1
4
That limit, however, has not deterred charges that the existing
system of campaign finance is corrupt. Perhaps a lower limit
would eliminate the corruption and apparent corruption on the
theory that a $100 contribution is not corrupting even if a $1,000
contribution is. However, the $1,000 individual contribution
limit set by Congress in 1974 equals less than half of that
amount today because of inflation, 95 which undercuts the force of
the argument. Also, a lower limit would exacerbate the
difficulties in trying to raise campaign funds when the recusal
requirement is in effect.
The scope of the recusal requirement is thus inversely related
to the availability of campaign contributions. My proposal
here-to require recusal from legislative matters affecting a
more than de minimis or general interest of a corporation, PAC,
other organization or individual who contributed more than
$1,000-reflects only one way of balancing the need for private
campaign contributions with the concern about corruption. A
broader application of the rule to all contributions made by all
entities would eliminate all corruption, but it would do so at the
cost of leaving any viable sources of campaign funds other than
personal wealth or public financing. A narrower application of
the rule that excludes some contributors or those contributors
with only non-economic interests would free up more money for
campaigns, but would simultaneously reopen the door to charges
of corruption. In other words, the recusal requirement always
avoids the First Amendment pitfalls of traditional campaign
finance reform proposals, but it must then strike an uneasy bal-
94See 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(1)(A) (1994).
95 See Shrink Missouri Government PAC v. Adams, 161 F.3d 519, 523 n.4 (8th Cir.
1998), cert. granted sub nom. Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 119 S. Ct.
901 (1999) (noting that a state contribution limit of $1,075 established in 1976 was
equal to $378 in 1998 dollars when adjusted by the consumer price index). The failure
to periodically adjust a contribution limit for inflation gives rise to its own constitu-
tional claim. Id. at 522-23 (judging the constitutionality of the 1976 state contribution
limits by their meaning "[iun today's dollars").
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ance between avoiding corruption and allowing for the actual
funding of campaigns.
IV. THE RECUSAL REQUIREMENT AND THE NATURE OF
CORRUPTION
I know that the recusal requirement proposed here would work
a dramatic change in the manner in which political candidates
and legislatures operate. Recusal of an elected official from a
particular matter draws attention already, even when the recusal
is because of financial or personal interests. Senator Lott's deci-
sion to recuse from the tobacco legislation that was deliberated
by Congress in 1997 and 1998 was characterized as "apparently
unprecedented."96 To require a legislator to recuse himself from
participating in legislative business whenever the interests of a
campaign contributor would be affected would have the seem-
ingly drastic consequences of either disqualifying countless leg-
islators from voting on certain bills or cutting the flow of cam-
paign money to a trickle. To extend the recusal requirement to
the President would be even more drastic. 97
But drastic measures may be necessary if the existing cam-
paign finance system really is corrupt. Many believe that it is.9"
That view, however, is not universally held. Indeed, the measure
of the existing system of campaign finance depends upon one's
definition of "corrupt." The stigma of corruption has been ap-
plied to a host of activities, with little agreement about when the
label is appropriate.99 Thomas Burke offers perhaps the most
helpful analysis of the idea of corruption in the context of cam-
paign finance. He distinguishes three types of corruption: (1) a
quid pro quo in which a legislator takes money in exchange for
an official action, (2) a legislator's actions affected by monetary
influence, and (3) the distortion of policymaking by money that
causes a legislator to act inconsistently with public opinion.'
96 Henry, supra note 46, at 22.
9 Cf id. (noting that "it is rare for a President to recuse himself on anything because
he has such a wide-ranging impact on policy").
98 See supra text accompanying notes 10-29.
99 See Strauss, supra note 91, at 142 (observing that "[t]he claim that the current sys-
tem of campaign finance is corrupt can mean many things"); Lowenstein, supra note
50, at 798-806 (recounting various possible understandings of corruption).
100 See Thomas F. Burke, The Concept of Corruption in Campaign Finance Law, 14
CONST. COMM. 127, 131 (1997).
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The rhetoric about the corruption of the campaign finance sys-
tem presupposes either the monetary influence or the distortion
standard. To the extent that the objectionable corruption is
monetary influence, the question becomes whether campaign
contributions do in fact influence legislative decision-making.
Many simply assume that they do, but the empirical evidence is
more highly contested.101 To the extent that the objectionable
corruption is the distortion of legislative policymaking, the
question then becomes what does an undistorted legislative pro-
cess look like? Or, more broadly, an understanding of corruption
as distortion implicates fundamental theories of representation.l °2
101 The most extraordinary demonstration of the disagreement about the corruption of
the existing system occurred during a colloquy between Senator McCain and his Re-
publican colleagues in the Senate who resented the characterization of their activities as
corrupt. See 145 Cong. Rec. S 12575-S 12668 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1999). For other exam-
ples of the contested assumptions and evidence about the corruption of the current
campaign finance system, compare Elizabeth Drew, The Corruption of American Poli-
tics: What Went Wrong and Why (1999), and Justice Souter on Campaign Cash, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 6, 1999, at A22 (reporting that Justice Souter stated during an oral argu-
ment in a campaign finance case that "[m]ost people assume, and I do, certainly, that
someone making an extraordinarily large contribution gets something extraordinary in
return"), and Lowenstein, supra note 7, at 306-35 (analyzing the evidence and con-
cluding that "[t]he campaign finance system is corrupt"), and Lowenstein, supra note
50, at 826-27 (insisting that "almost no one denies that special interest campaign con-
tributions usually are intended to influence the official acts of recipients" and that
"[t]here is also ample anecdotal evidence and some quantitative evidence that contribu-
tions do in fact influence official actions") (footnotes omitted), and J. Skelly Wright,
Money and the Pollution of Politics: Is the First Amendment an Obstacle to Political
Equality?, 82 COLuM. L. REV. 609, 618 (1982) (contending that "[w]hatever the cause
and effect relationship, studies of issue after issue demonstrate that a much higher per-
centage of legislators who voted with a PAC's position received money from that PAC
in the previous campaign than those who voted the other way"), with FRANK J. SORAUF,
MONEY IN AMERICAN ELECTIONS 307-17 (1988) (examining the evidence and con-
cluding that "there simply are no data in the systematic studies that would support the
popular assertions about the 'buying' of the Congress or about any other massive
influence of money on the legislative process:'), and Smith, Money Talks, supra note 6,
at 58 (indicating that "systematic studies of voting records ... have found little or no
connection between campaign contributions and legislative voting records.'), and
Smith, Faulty Assumptions, supra note 6, at 1071 (concluding that "[t]he available evi-
dence simply does not show a meaningful, causal relationship between campaign con-
tributions and legislative voting patterns'"); see generally ROSENTHAL, supra note 7, at
150-51 (suggesting that the results of the empirical studies are inconclusive, but that
nearly everyone believes that campaign contributions buy influence); Burke, supra note
100, at 139 n.45 (suggesting that "contributions do influence representatives, but less
than many suppose. Political scientists have produced a wealth of studies on this ques-
tion but are only beginning to answer it."); Bruce E. Cain, Moralism and Realism in
Campaign Finance Reform, 1995 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 111, 114 & n.14 (citing empirical
studies which show that the influence of campaign contributions "is a lively topic of
dispute in political science:').
102 For helpful discussions of the relationship between theories of representation and
appropriate models of campaign finance, see Burke, supra note 100, at 140-48; Lowen-
stein, supra note 50, at 831-43.
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The recusal requirement responds to either the monetary
influence or the distortion theory of corruption. If the idea of
corruption is best limited to the quid pro quo understanding,
then the recusal requirement is misguided. Recusal makes sense
only if campaign contributions do influence legislative decisions
or distort the legislative process in a way that can properly be
characterized as corrupt. The wisdom of the recusal requirement
thus turns on the resolution of those empirical and theoretical
disputes. But the contested meaning of corruption affects more
than just the recusal requirement. Proponents of contribution and
expenditure limits and other typical features of campaign finance
reform claim that their remedies are necessary to eliminate cor-
ruption, thereby presuming either the monetary influence or
distortion theories of corruption. Even if they are right, the re-
cusal requirement demands that the defenders of more traditional
campaign finance reform proposals explain why such measures
are better suited to combat corruption than recusal.
The fact that the recusal requirement is designed to combat
corruption has one more consequence for the debate over cam-
paign finance reform. Even if the current system is not corrupt,
there may be other reasons to promote campaign finance reform.
Defenders of campaign finance reform point to the need to free
legislators from the distraction of having to raise vast sums of
money and the need to equalize the electoral playing field as in-
dependent reasons for imposing more stringent contribution and
expenditure restrictions.0 3 These arguments are not without
force, but they suffer from two possibly fatal shortcomings.
First, the Supreme Court views them as inadequate to justify
campaign finance regulation.' 14 Of course, the Court may be
103 See, e.g., Vincent Blasi, Free Speech and the Widening Gyre of Fund-Raising: Why
Campaign Spending Limits May Not Violate the First Amendment After All, 94 COLUM.
L. REv. 1281 (1994) (advancing the distraction argument); Symposium, Money, Poli-
tics, and Equality, 77 "Ihx. L. REV. 1603 (1999) (collection of articles analyzing the
equalization argument); Foley, supra note 20 (advancing the equalization argument).
David Strauss has argued that concerns about corruption are really concerns about
equality of the democratic process, but that simply returns us to the contested under-
standing of corruption. See David A. Strauss, Corruption, Equality, and Campaign
Finance Reform, 94 COLuM. L. REV. 1369, 1371-75 (1994).
104 See ISSACHAROFF, KARLAN & PILDES, supra note 36, at 645 (noting that "[a]fter
Buckley, it appeared that the sole legitimate government interest in regulating campaign
finance lay in removing the temptation for corruption"); Burke, supra note 100, at 127
(agreeing that Buckley rejected campaign finance goals "such as equalizing the
influence of citizens over elections, limiting the influence of money in electoral politics,
or creating more competitive elections"). The Court has shown some-but not too
much-flexibility in that position since Buckley. See LOWENSTEIN, supra note 30, at
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wrong, but until it changes its mind, any effort to ground cam-
paign finance reform in the distraction or equalization argument
is probably doomed. Second, those arguments do not appear to
be as persuasive as the corruption argument. Most accounts of
the need for campaign finance reform begin by stating concerns
about the corrupting influence of campaign contributions and
spending, and turn to the other arguments only once the corrup-
tion theme is exhausted. In other words, in the brief that cam-
paign finance reform defenders submit to the public, corruption
is the lead argument, and the other arguments are visibly secon-
dary. Whatever momentum campaign finance reform enjoys is
primarily attributable to the corruption argument, not to a pas-
sionate public desire to relieve legislators of the burdens of
raising campaign funds or to assure every political candidate an
equal source of campaign funds.
What this means for the recusal requirement is that the domi-
nance of the corruption argument matters. So are campaign con-
tributions corrupting? I am not sure. The rhetoric suggesting that
they are masks the other reasons why legislators act as they do
and why contributors give money in political campaigns. There
are, however, many troubling anecdotal suggestions of the
influence of campaign contributions on legislative decisions,
though the empirical studies have yielded mixed results. Either
way, the recusal requirement renders obsolete traditional cam-
paign finance reform proposals to restrict contributions and ex-
penditures. If the existing system is not corrupt, then the recusal
requirement becomes unnecessary, but so do other campaign
finance proposals because the alternative justifications for such
reform are both rhetorically and constitutionally inadequate. If
the existing system is corrupt, then the recusal requirement of-
fers a drastic but understandable remedy that avoids the First
Amendment objections to regulating money that is spent to
speak. It addresses the influence of money, rather than money
itself. It would change the way that contributors, candidates and
the legislature do business, but that is precisely the point. Thus if
we are concerned that the existing system of financing cam-
paigns is corrupt or that it appears to be corrupt, it is worthwhile
to begin considering measures that directly respond to that con-
cern.
541 (observing that "later campaign finance decisions have seemed to show fluctuating
attitudes on the Court toward equalizing regulations").
20001

